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IN DEFENSE OF NAIVE UNIVERSALISM
Daniel Howard-Snyder

Michael J. Murray defends the traditional doctrine of hell by arguing directly
against its chief competitor, universalism. Universalism, says Murray, comes
in "naIve" and "sophisticated" forms. Murray poses two arguments against
naIve universalism before focusing on sophisticated universalism, which is
his real target. He proceeds in this fashion because he thinks that his arguments against sophisticated universalism is more easily motivated against
naIve universalism, and once their force is clearly seen in the naIve case it
will be more clearly seen in the sophisticated. In this essay, I argue that
Murray's arguments against naIve universalism have no force whatsoever.

1. Naive U1liversalism
According to naIve universalism, says Michael Murray, "upon death all
persons are instantly transformed by God in such a way that they fully
desire communion with God and are thus fit for enjoying the beatific vision
forever".! This, however, is only a species of the genus. Another species has
it that human organisms tum to dust and ashes not long after their deaths,
and go out of existence for a very long time; but, on the Great Day, they are
resurrected, at which time they are judged for their earthly lives and then
instantly transformed by God so that they fully desire communion with
Him and are thus fit for enjoying the beatific vision forever. Yet another
species is that, upon death, human souls are released from their bodies and
"sleep" for a very long time; but, on the Great Day, they are awakened and
reunited with their resurrected bodies, judged for their earthly lives, and
then instantly transformed by God so that they fully desire communion
with Him and are thus fit for enjoying the beatific vision forever. And there
are many other species besides. What is essential to the genus is the thesis
that,

after death, God will instantaneously transform all persons in such a
way that they fully desire communion with God and are thus fit for
enjoying the beatific vision forever.
It is not essential that the instantaneous transformation occur upon death,
contrary to what Murray says.
This divine post-mortem instantaneous transformation thesis, as we might
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call it, is compatible with the claim that nobody ever has had or ever will
have communion with God; for one can fully desire something and be fit
for it, and yet not get it. Consequently, the naive universalist will insist on
the communion thesis, the proposition that
all persons will have communion with God and be fit for enjoying
the beatific vision forever.
NaIve universalism, then, is comprised of these two, and only these two,
essential theses. 2 Traditionalists deny both of them; sophisticated universalists only deny the first.
I tum now to Murray's arguments.

2. The Gratuitous Earthly Life
Naive universalism, contends Murray, "seems to undercut the possibility
that the earthly life and the evils it contains have any significance, thus
making the evils of the earthly life utterly gratuitous" (61). But why suppose that naIve universalism has this untoward implication?

2.1 Initial Assessment of the Argument from Gratuitous Evil
According to Murray, naIve universalism implies that the evils of the
earthly life are gratuitous because
On the [naIve universalist's] picture, all human beings end up in perfect communion with God, enjoying the beatific vision forever. This
entails, however, that one's fate in eternity is entirely independent of
the individual choices a person makes and the beliefs a person adopts
in the earthly phase of their existence. Thus, the evils that one experiences in the earthly life are gratuitous. Why, one is led to wonder,
would God put us through such a pointless exercise, an exercise filled
with much misery, suffering, and travail, only in the end to invest the
experience with no ultimate consequence or significance? (56)
What, exactly, is the argument here? It appears to be this:

The Argument from Gratuitous Evil
1. If naive universalism is true, then all human beings end up in perfect communion with God (by divine post-mortem instantaneous
transformation), enjoying the beatific vision forever.
2. Necessarily, if all human beings end up in perfect communion
with God (by divine post-mortem instantaneous transformation),
enjoying the beatific vision forever, then their fate in eternity is
entirely independent of their earthly choices and beliefs.
3. Necessarily, if their fate in eternity is entirely independent of their
earthly choices and beliefs, then all of the earthly evils they in fact
experience are gratuitous.
4. So, if naIve universalism is true, then all of the earthly evils human
beings in fact experience are gratuitous. (1-3)
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5. Necessarily, if God exists, it is false that all of the earthly evils
human beings in fact experience are gratuitous.
6. So, if God exists, naIve universalism is false. (4,5)
What should we make of this intriguing argument?
Premise 5 is arguably true. For even if God might permit some gratuitous
evil, He would not permit all the earthly evils that human beings in fact
experience if all of them were gratuitous. 3 But what about premises 1-3?
Let's begin with premise 1. Why suppose it is true? Presumably because,
by definition, naIve universalism implies that all human beings will end up in
perfect communion with God. But that can't be right. Neither of the two
definitive theses of naive universalism, nor their conjunction, state or imply
that all human beings end up in perfect communion with God. For (A) one
can fully desire communion with God and thus be fit for the beatific vision,
and even get it, and yet get an experientially imperfect version of it. Perhaps
(AI) God instantaneously transforms some persons so that they comprehend
and fully desire the most satisfying communion with Him, but the degree to
which He grants them their desire and gives them what they are fit for varies
dramatically according to their earthly choices and beliefs. Alternatively,
perhaps (A2) the degree to which God instantaneously transforms some persons varies according to their earthly choices and beliefs, in which case He
might only transform them so that they comprehend and fully desire an
experientially paler version of communion, paler than one that they might
have desired and experienced had their earthly choices and beliefs been different. In at least these two ways (and, no doubt, there are others), naIve universalism is compatible with some persons-perhaps even all persons-ending up in communion with God, enjoying the beatific vision forever, but not
ending up in perfect communion. Therefore, premise 1 is false. 4
Suppose we substitute a true premise for Murray's premise I, a premise
that accurately represents the implications of naIve universalism-say, by
dropping the word "perfect" from 1. Consider it done. In that case, we'll
have to modify premise 2, in order to retain a valid argument:
2*.

Necessarily, if all human beings end up in communion with God
(by divine post-mortem instantaneous transformation), enjoying the beatific vision forever, then their fate in eternity is
entirely independent of their earthly choices and beliefs.

Unfortunately, 2* is false. For, as we just saw in the last paragraph, even if
naIve wLiversalism is true, one's fate in eternity-that is, how things go for
one in eternity-may well depend, in no small part, on one's earthly choices and beliefs. Of course, the naIve universalist claims that one's being in
communion with God will not depend on such things; after death, one will
enjoy the beatific vision, forever. But other facts about one's communion
with God---enormously significant facts-may well depend on one's choices and beliefs, as options (AI) and (A2) suggest.

2.2 Four Objections
Responding to four objections to my assessment of The Argument from
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Gratuitous Evil will clarify and, I hope, strengthen my case against it.
Objection 1. "Contrary to what you say, naive universalism has three essential theses, not two. The third thesis-the perfection thesis, let's call it-is this:
• Post-mortem communion with God will be perfect for all those
who experience it.
Anything less would be beneath the magnanimity of one perfect in love. So
your initial assessment of Murray's premise 1 is incompatible with naIve
universalism."
Reply. I have two things to say about this objection. First, many contemporary universalists-none of whom, so far as I know, are naive ones5-possess
moral sentiments that would incline them to affirm the perfection thesis if
they were naive universalists. I will insist, however, that the perfection thesis
is not essential to naive universalism. For it puts naive universalism at odds
with an ancient Christian doctrine-affirmed by many Greek and Latin
Fathers, some Protestant divines, and, arguably, St. Paul and Jesus-according to which, as J.N.D. Kelly abbreviates it, "the felicity of the blessed will be
graded in accordance with their merits".' The naive wLiversalist has enough
of a burden to bear in denying the canonical teaching of the Church on the
eternal punishment of the tmrepentant; to insist that she must, as a matter of
definition, bear yet another, even if lesser, burden is uncharitable.
Second, consider a species of naiVe universalism that does endorse the
perfection thesis. Its proponent will accept premise 1, but deny premise 2as should the rest of us. For consider this possibility: (B) one can fully desire
commwLion with God and thus be fit for the beatific vision, and even get a
perfect version of it, but arrive at it imperfectly. All else being equal, if one
arrives at the beatific state kicking and screaming or with a yawn, one will
bring about a state of affairs that is significantly worse than the state of
affairs that one would have brought about if one had arrived with open
(even if trembling) arms. That is, all else being equal, state of affairs
I. One's arriving kicking and screaming or with a yawn at a perfect ver-

sion of the vision and experiencing it forever after
is worse than the state of affairs that might have obtained, namely,
II. One's arriving with open arms at a perfect version of the vision and
experiencing it forever after.
Although (I) and (II) share an equally good part-namely, a perfect version
of the vision, experienced forever after-(l1) is significantly better than (I).
(There are different accounts of why (II) is better than (I), but my purposes
do not call for me to take a stand on that matter. That (II) is better than (I)
suffices.) And here an important point emerges: whether one's fate in eternity includes (I) or the comparatively much better (II) depends on one's
earthly choices and beliefs-evell if one will end up in perfect communion
with God forever after. So, the naiVe universalist rightly denies premise 2,
even if she endorses the perfection thesis.
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Objection 2. "You have misunderstood Murray. He did not mean to
imply that, on naIve universalism, nothing that happens to one in the afterlife depends on one's earthly choices and beliefs. He only meant that, on
naIve universalism, the fact that one will enter into eternal communion with
God, enjoying the beatific vision forever does not depend on one's earthly
choices and beliefs. That fact, and that fact alone, is what he means by the
words 'fate in eternity'. Thus, you should have formulated his second
premise like this:

2**. Necessarily, if all human beings end up in communion with
God (by divine post-mortem instantaneous transformation),
enjoying the beatific vision forever, then they will end up in eternal communion with God entirely independently of their earthly
choices and beliefs.
Putting it this way avoids the criticisms you've raised."
Reply. Perhaps it does. But note that if Murray goes with 2**, he has a
valid argument only if he modifies premise 3 like this:
3**. Necessarily, if all human beings will end up in eternal communion
with God entirely independently of their earthly choices and
beliefs, then all of the earthly evils they in fact experience are
gratuitous.
But why suppose 3** is true?
Here we need to tend carefully to Murray's definition of "gratuitous
evil". An evil is gratuitous, he says, if and only if it is not non-gratuitous.
And,
NGE. An evil E is non-gratuitous if, and only if, (a) there exists some
outweighing intrinsic good G such that it was not within God's
power to achieve G without either permitting E or permitting some
other evil at least as bad as E and (b) there is not some further intrinsic good G*, which is both exclusive of G and greater than G, which
could have been secured without permitting E or some other evil at
least as bad as E. (56)
Murray argues for premise 3** on the grounds that conjunct (b) in the right
half of NGE is not satisfied, even if the intrinsic goods of the earthly life
satisfy conjunct (a). For
[t]he intrinsic goods of the earthly life, on the [naive universalist]
scheme, seem outweighed by the good one would have experienced
if one had been created enjoying perfect communion with God from
the beginning. Why would God prefer to have us spend our first seventy or so years of existence in this earthly phase, enjoying a measure
of intrinsic good but with the accompanying evil required to secure
it, rather than positioning us in such a way that these years are spent
in perfect communion with Him in heaven? After all, any earthly
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goods obtained would pale in comparison with the goods achieved
by spending those years in this way. (57)
What should we make of the line of thought here?
Well, firstly, it involves a misleading characterization of the goods that
might justify God in permitting evil and suffering, on the naiVe universalist
scheme. From what Murray says here, you'd think that only the "intrinsic
goods of the earthly life" could justify God in permitting earthly evil and
suffering, on naIve universalism. But that's just not true. Goods of the afterlife might justify God as well, as we've seen. Secondly, ignoring Murray's
misleading characterization, and focusing instead on conjunction (b) of
NGE, we can see that the main premise in the argument of the passage is
(must be) that
• There is a good-namely, (III) a state of affairs in which human
beings are created enjoying perfect communion with God from the
beginning7-that is exclusive of and greater than any good for the
sake of which God permits evil and suffering and this good could
have been secured without permitting any evil or suffering.
But this premise is false. For, on the naiVe universalist's scheme, there
exists some outweighing good state of affairs for the sake of which God
may well have permitted evil and suffering and which was not within
God's power to achieve if he had prevented all evil and suffering, namely:
(IV) All humans are created free with respect to (i) ordering their
souls and being responsible for the well-being of others, in the
earthly life, and (ii) choosing to be in perfect, eternal communion with God, and being fit in the earthly life for such communion. Each of them in fact chooses rightly, for the most part,
despite temptations and trials to the contrary. After their
deaths, God completes the job for them by instantaneously
transforming them into the sorts of persons that they approximated on their own.
Furthermore, Murray's (III) is not greater than (IV). Consequently, both the
main premise of Murray's argument for 3**, and 3** itself, are false.
Objection 3. "Murray is mainly concerned not with those who are well on
their way to developing godly characters but rather with those who have
not 'cultivated well-ordered characters' (58), 'those who have cultivated
self-loving characters' (58), those who '[want] no part of communion with
God' (64), those with characters that 'preclude the desire to be in communion with God,' (60) those who 'shun communion with God' (64). On naIve
universalism, Murray states, 'they will be "miraculously transformed" into
lovers of God'; consequently, 'the evil [they experience] in via is thoroughly
gratuitous' (58). These words suggest that he means to restrict his argument to those who are indifferent toward God, or worse, and who perish
in their indifference. R In that case, we might revise his argument like this:
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The Revised Argument from Gratuitous Evil
lr. If naive universalism is true and there are some who perish in

2r.

3r.

4r.
5r.
6r.

indifference, then there are some who perish in indifference and
end up in communion with God (by divine post-mortem instantaneous transformation), enjoying the beatific vision forever.
Necessarily, if there are some who perish in indifference and
end up in communion with God (by divine post-mortem
instantaneous transformation), enjoying the beatific vision forever, then there are some who perish in indifference and end up
in communion with God entirely independently of their earthly
choices and beliefs.
Necessarily, if there are some who perish in indifference and
end up in communion with God entirely independently of their
earthly choices and beliefs, then all of the earthly evils they
experience are gratuitous.
So, if naIve universalism is true and there are some who perish
in indifference, then all of the earthly evils they experience are
gratuitous. (Ir-3r)
Necessarily, if God exists, it is false that all of the earthly evils
they experience are gratuitous.
So, if God exists, naIve universalism is false. (4r,5r)

This revised argument avoids all of the criticisms that you have raised
thus far."
Reply. Does it? Suppose we modify the main premise of Murray's argument for premise 3** so that it is a defense of premise 3r. In that case, the
main premise will be this:
There is a good-namely, (III') a state of affairs in which those who
perish in indifference are created enjoying perfect communion with
God from the beginning-that is greater than any good for the sake
of which God permits evil and suffering and this good could have
been secured without permitting any evil or suffering.
But this premise is false. For, on the naIve universalist's scheme, there exists
some outweighing good state of affairs for the sake of which God may well
have permitted evil and suffering, a good state of affairs that is compatible
with there being some who perish in indifference and which was not within
God's power to achieve without permitting some suffering and evil, namely:
(IV') Those who perish in their indifference are created free with
respect to (i) ordering their souls and being responsible for the
well-being of others, in the earthly life, and (ii) choosing to be in
perfect, eternal communion with God, and being fit in the
earthly life for such communion. Each of them in fact chooses
rightly, for the most part, despite temptations and trials to the
contrary. After their deaths, God completes the job for them by
instantaneously transforming them into the sorts of persons
that they approximated on their own.
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Murray's (III') is not greater than (IV'). Consequently, the modified main
premise of Murray's argument from 3r, and 3r itself, are false.
Objection 4. Although the objection I am about to give targets both of
your replies to Objections 2 and 3, I'll spell it out with respect to the latter.
You say that 'on the naive universalist's scheme, there exists some outweighing good state of affairs for the sake of which God may well have permitted evil and suffering,' a good that is at least as great as Murray's (III')
and which could not obtain without the permission of some evil and suffering, namely the state of affairs you label (IV'). To be sure, (IV') exists; that is,
there is some unactualized, merely possible state of affairs that you've
described. But (IV') has not occurred, and never will occur. And there lies
the difficulty. For even if there is some unactualized, merely possible outweighing intrinsic good, so long as it never occurs, so long as it never
becomes actual, it does not justify God in permitting any evil or suffering.9
Thus, it is false that, on the naIve universalist's scheme, there exists-that is,
there has occurred or will occur-some outweighing good state of affairs of
the sort you've described for the sake of which God may well have permitted evil and suffering. At any rate, (IV') is no such state of affairs."
Reply. I deny that if some good state of affairs justifies God in permitting
evil and suffering, it must become actual at some point in the future, if it is
not already actual. It is false that if some unactualized, merely possible
good exists but never occurs, then it does not justify God in permitting any
evil and suffering. He may be justified in permitting a good deal of evil
and suffering for the sake of a monumentally good state of affairs provided
the expected utilities justify the permission. And on the naIve universalist's
scheme, the expected utilities may well justify the permission of a good
deal of evil and suffering, given that God's initial goal was to bring about
either (IV) or (IV'). Sadly enough, neither state of affairs has occurred;
indeed, they will (now) never occur. But it does not follow that He was not
justified in permitting the evil and suffering required for them to occur.
That follows only if the expected utilities did not justify their permission.
And this need not be the case, given the universalist's scheme.lO
II

2.3 Traditionalism and Murray's Argument from Gratuitous Evil
It behooves the traditionalist to resist Murray's Argument from Gratuitous
Evil. For, if it succeeds against naIve universalism, an analogous argument
succeeds against traditionalism:

1rt. If traditionalism is true, then there are some who perish in
indifference and end up in hell forever.
2rt. Necessarily, if there are some who perish in indifference and
end up in hell forever, then all of the earthly evils they experience are gratuitous.
3rt. So, if traditionalism is true, then there are some who perish in
indifference and all of the earthly evils that they experience are
gratuitous. (1rt,2rt)
4rt. Necessarily, if God exists, it is false that there are some who
perish in indifference and all of the earthly evils that they experience are gratuitous.
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So, if God exists, traditionalism is false. (4rt,5rt)

And in defense of premise 2rt, we have this Murrayesque line of thought:
2rta. Necessarily, if there are some who perish in indifference and
end up in hell forever, then there is a good-namely, (III') a state
of affairs in which they are created enjoying perfect communion
with God from the beginning-that is both exclusive of and
greater than the goods for the sake of which God permits their
earthly suffering and this good could have been secured without permitting any evil or suffering.
2rtb. Necessarily, if there is a good-namely, (lII')-of the sort
described, then all of the earthly evils experienced by those who
perish in indifference and end up in hell are gratuitous.
I suggest that the traditionalist respond to this argument in a manner analogous to that in which I have responded to Murray's.l1 Let's tum now to
Murray's second argument.

3. The Denial of "Autonomy"
Murray's second argument is rooted in the idea that, on naIve universalism, a certain feature of free choice would be missing, a feature that gives
free choice "the significance that makes it worth having" (59). He calls the
feature he has in mind" autonomy," "a freedom of choosing that is
expressed in actions that influence the course of events ill the world" (58, his
emphasis).12 He further describes what he has in mind in this passage:
[A] world with "autonomous" creatures is a world where creatures
are not only allowed to make evil choices, but choices which issue in
evil acts and have evil consequences. A world with agents who can
choose freely but are unable to act autonomously would be a world
filled with freely choosing brains-in-vats. While free choosing might
go on, the choices would never have expression in or impact on the
local environment, whether good or evil. (58, his emphasis)
Now, Murray is well aware of the fact that one can have autonomy with
respect to one state of affairs but not another. Indeed, he explicitly states
that naIve universalists can allow that human beings have autonomy
with respect to the development of their earthly characters, i.e. "soulmaking" (59); and they can allow that human beings are autonomous
with respect to earthly love of God. On these things all sides are agreed.
So, what's the problem?
Murray begins to express the problem he has in mind like this:
... [W]hile [naIve universalism] allows freedom of choice, it denies
autonomy (in the above sense) because eternal outcomes do not vary
with earthly choices. (59)
This expression of the problem is unfortunate, twice over. First, it is a nOIl-
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sequitur. It simply does not follow from the fact (if it were a fact) that naive
universalism implies that "eternal outcomes do not vary with earthly
choices" that naIve universalism "denies autonomy". NaIve universalism
can allow autonomy with respect to earthly soul-making and earthly love
of God even if it does not allow autonomy with respect to eternal outcomes. Second, it is false that naIve universalism does not allow autonomy
with respect to eternal outcomes. As we saw in section 2 it can do so in several ways, and, no doubt, there are other ways.
(This is as good a place as any to mention another one. J see no reason to
think that, throughout eternity, we won't able to remember our earthly
careers. What will we remember? Well, might not the choices we make during our earthly careers have a bearing on the answer to that question? Will
we remember spurning God? Will we remember willfully ignoring His
love, His will, His commandments? Will we remember needlessly harming
His creatures, human and nonhuman? Will we remember untold unkindnesses toward other humans, all of whom (on universalism) we will be
with forever in the community of the blessed? To the extent that we will
remember such things, we will have cause for lingering regret. How much
will we have to regret? And how gnawing will it be? That all depends, I
would think. It depends on what we choose and believe, now, during our
earthly lives. This, then, is another way in which autonomy with respect to
eternal outcomes can vary according to earthly choices and beliefs.)
Murray continues with these words:
... [a] [W]hile [naIve universalism] allows human beings to make
choices, including choices that are relevant for soul-making, it does
not allow outcomes to vary accordingly, since those who choose to
develop characters which are self-directed and not God-directed are
summarily transformed. [b] More broadly we might say that one can
choose to cultivate a morally vicious character, but in the end one cannot have such a character. [c] One can choose to act in such a way as
to acquire such a character, but in the end one will be unable to effect
such a development in character. (59, his emphasis)
Here, again, we need to avoid misrepresentation. As for [a], there are some
outcomes which naIve universalism does not allow to vary in accordance
with the choices that human beings make; specifically, it does not allow the
fact that one enters into eternal communion with God to vary in accordance with human choices. It does, however, allow many other outcomes to
vary in accordance with human choices, even eternal outcomes, as we've
already seen. As for [b], on naIve universalism, one can both choose to cultivate a morally vicious character and, in the end, really get one, one that
would endure forever if it weren't for God's transformative grace.
Similarly for [c]. Although one cannot choose to act in such a way as to
acquire a morally vicious character that lasts forever, one can, in the end,
affect a morally vicious character. All that follows from naive univeralism
is that no human being has autonomy with respect to being eternally indifferent toward God.
So now, with these misrepresentations out of the way and the actual
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implications of nai've universalism firmly in mind, what becomes of
Murray's argument? It starts out like this:
1.

If naiVe universalism is true, then no human being has autono-

2.

my with respect to being indifferent forever.
Necessarily, if no human being has autonomy with respect to
being indifferent forever, then ....

Then what? How are we supposed to proceed? What Murray says follows
is this:
... [2a] for God to set us up in this fashion [i.e., so that no human
being has autonomy with respect to being indifferent toward God
forever] is just to take away the autonomy we need for free action to
have the significance that makes it worth having. [2b] One might
think about [naiVe universalism] by way of the following analogy.
On the picture proposed by the rnai've] universalist, it is as if one
were to go to the drive-through window at a fast food restaurant,
make a selection, and order. But, no matter what is ordered, the
attendant hands over the same food. If you order fish, you get a hamburger, if you order ice cream, you get a hamburger, if you order
French fries, you get a hamburger. ... You are welcome to freely
choose whatever menu item you like, but at this restaurant, you have
it their way. [2c] And so it is on the [nai've] universalist picture. You
are welcome to do whatever you like, but with God, you have it His
way. [2d] As a result, while free choosing may go on in the [nai've]
universalist's world, it is a free choosing that is without autonomy,
since one is transformed into a lover of God, whether one chooses to
be such or not. (59, his emphasis)
What should we make of these four alledged implications, [2a]-[2d]?
Unfortunately, none of them constitutes an accurate characterization of
naive universalism or its implications. [2c] does not follow. On naiVe universalism, there are lots of things we do not have His way. His way has all of us
loving Him and each other, in the here and now. [2d] is a non-sequitur. Even
if "one is transformed into a lover of God, whether one chooses to be such or
not," it does not follow that one's free choosing is "a free choosing that is
without autonomy". Only free choosing with respect to being indifferent
toward God forever is without autonomy, on the nai've universalist's picture.
[2a] does not follow since it neglects the fact that, on naive universalism, we
have autonomy with respect to many things other than being indifferent
toward God forever. As for [2b], the drive-thru analogy: although it provides
a good laugh, it is inapt. A more apt analogy has it that the kitchen sink isn't
on the menu, but if you order fish, you get it, if you order ice cream, you get,
if you order French fries, you get them ... You are welcome to choose freely
whatever menu item you like, but at this restaurant, the kitchen sink stays.
(Hardly a surprise.) And so it is on naiVe universalism. You are welcome to
choose freely whatever menu item you like, but humanity broiled eternally
isn't on the menu. My analogy is more apt than Murray's since, unlike
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Murray's, it does not imply that on universalism we have no autonomy
whatsoever.
So, we're in search of a way to complete premise 2 of the Argument
from the Denial of Autonomy. Fortunately, a plausible candidate is implicit on the bottom of Murray's page 59. The naiVe universalist, says Murray,
seems to admit that "there are occasions in which we ought to prefer to
lose our autonomy rather than experience the consequences of our choices". Indeed, the naIve universalist does admit this. In fact, she heralds it,
shouts it from the mountaintops. With respect to being indifferent toward
God forever, the naive universalist insists, it is preferable that we lose our
autonomy rather than experience what would be the consequences of our
choices on the traditionalist picture, i.e. suffering in hell forever. So let's go
with it. In that case, we have this completion of premise 2:
2.

Necessarily, if no human being has autonomy with respect to
being indifferent forever, then it is preferable not to have autonomy on that score than to suffer in hell forever.

At this point, Murray observes that God could have arranged earthly
affairs so that we have free choice at all times, but autonomy only when the
choice we made was morally good. If God had arranged earthly affairs in
this way, morally evil choices would be allowed, but they would never be
permitted to affect how earthly affairs go. He calls such an arrangement
"limited earthly autonomy". Now, compare limited earthly autonomy with
"limited eternal autonomy," which Murray characterizes as follows:
Universalists hold that God allows us to make free choices in matters
that bear on the outworking of our character, but they also hold that
God does not allow such choices to have their natural outcome when
that means becoming an enduringly vicious character, i.e., becoming
a person who is not fit for perfect communion with God. Thus the
"natural" outcome for those who cultivate a character which precludes the desire to be in perfect communion with God, viz., separation from God, is thwarted, with the result that only those choices
which contribute towards the having of a God-loving character have
any effect on one's eternal state. (60)
How does the distinction between limited earthly autonomy and limited
eternal autonomy bear on naive universalism? In this way, says Murray:
If God is obliged 13 to give free creatures limited eternal autonomy (as
most universalists argue), why not limited earthly autonomy as well?
To put it another way: if, for whatever reason, God deems it unfitting
to grant limited earthly autonomy, why doesn't the same hold,
mutatis mutandis, for eternal autonomy? Any answer which would
justify one would seem to justify the other. Thus, since limited autonomy is not found in the earthly arena, we have no reason to think
that different principles would be at work in the case of eternity. (60)
Putting the pieces together, we have this argument:
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The Argument from the Denial of Autonomy
1.
If naive universalism is true, then no human being has autonomy with respect to being indifferent forever.
2.
Necessarily, if no human being has autonomy with respect to
being indifferent forever, then it is preferable to lack autonomy
with respect to being indifferent forever than to suffer in hell
forever.
3.
Necessarily, if it is preferable to lack autonomy with respect to
being indifferent forever than to suffer in hell forever, then God
deems it fitting to grant limited eternal autonomy.
4.
Necessarily, if God deems it fitting to grant limited eternal
autonomy, then He deems it fitting to grant limited earthly
autonomy.
5.
It's false that God deems it fitting to grant limited earthly
autonomy.14
6.
So, naive universalism is false. (1-5)
What should we make of this argument?
To answer that question, let's first highlight certain features of Murray'S
characterization of limited eternal autonomy, in the next to the last passage
quoted above, and contrast it with another characterization that accurately
represents the actual implications of naive universalism. First, contrary to
what Murray says, on naIve universalism, God does allow our choices to
have their natural outcome when such choices are relevant to "becoming a
person who is not fit for perfect communion with God". What the naIve
universalist says is that if one's choices lead one in the earthly life to
become unfit for communion with God, then God will transform one after
death into one who is thus fit. Second, while Murray is right that, on naIve
universalism, "the 'natural' outcome for those who cultivate a character
which precludes the desire to be in perfect communion with God, viz., separation from God, is thwarted," it does not follow that "only those choices
which contribute towards the having of a God-loving character have any
effect on one's eternal state". For, as we have seen, naIve universalism
allows that many choices that contribute to the lack of a God-loving character have an effect on one's eternal state. So, Murray's characterization of
limited eternal autonomy is this:
God arranges earthly affairs so that "only those choices which contribute towards the having of a God-loving character have any effect
on one's eternal state".
He says this is a consequence of naIve universalism. He is wrong. Rather,
on that view, limited eternal autonomy is this:
God arranges earthly affairs so that those choices which contribute
toward earthly indifference have no effect on the fact that, after
death, one will be transformed into one who is fit for eternal communion with God.
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We have, therefore, two characterizations of limited eternal autonomy,
Murray's and the naIve universalist's. Which should we use in assessing
Murray's argument?
Suppose we use Murray's. In that case, what should we make of
premise 3? Premise 3, given his characterization (and spelling out what he
means by "limited eternal autonomy"), states that
3m. Necessarily, if it is preferable to lack autonomy with respect to
being indifferent forever than to suffer in hell forever, then God
deems it fitting to arrange earthly affairs so that "only those choices

which contribute towards the having of a God-loving character have
any effect on one's eternal state".
3m is false, for what I hope by now is an obvious reason. Even if it were
preferable that human beings lack autonomy with respect to being eternally indifferent toward God than to suffer hell forever, God might permit
other aspects of one's eternal state to be affected by earthly evil choices, e.g.
in the ways I've indicated in section 2.1 and in the second paragraph of
the present section.
Now suppose we use the naiVe universalist's characterization of limited
eternal autonomy to assess the argument in question. In that case, premise
3 states that
3u.

Necessarily, if it is preferable to lack autonomy with respect to
being indifferent forever than to suffer in hell forever, then God
deems it fitting to arrange earthly affairs so that those choices which

contribute toward earthly indifference have no effect on the fact that,
after death, we will be instantly transformed into persons who are fit
for eternal communion with God.
3u is true; however, we must modify premise 4 accordingly (to retain a
valid argument):
4u.

Necessarily, if God deems it fitting to arrange earthly affairs so

that those choices which contribute toward earthly indifference have
no effect on the fact that, after death, we will be instantly transformed into persons who are fit for eternal communion with God,
then He deems it fitting to grant limited earthly autonomy,
i.e. to arrange things in such a way that we have free choice at
all times on earth but autonomy only when the choice we
make is morally good.
What should we think of 4u? As we saw in the passage last quoted above,
Murray defends it by asserting a certain sort of symmetry between the two
cases. Whatever reason God has for deeming it fitting to grant limited eternal autonomy, He would have, mutatis mutandis, for deeming it fitting to
grant limited earthly autonomy; and, whatever reason God has for deeming it unfitting to grant limited earthly autonomy, He would have, mutatis
mutandis, for deeming it unfitting to grant limited eternal autonomy. So, if
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God grants the one, He grants the other; and, if He does not grant the one,
He does not grant the other.
Whatever merit this line of reasoning might have when it is Murray's
characterization of limited eternal autonomy that is at issue, it has none
whatsoever when it is the nai've universalist's characterization of limited
eternal autonomy that is on the table. There are some reasons for God to
deem it unfitting to arrange things so that we have limited earthly autonomy that would not hold, mutatis mutandis, for God to deem it unfitting to
arrange things so that we have eternal autonomy as characterized by the
naive universalist. For example, here's such a reason: an earthly life
arranged so that we have free choice at all times but autonomy only when
the choice we make is morally good would be one devoid of genuine loving relationships between humans and deep responsibility for the wellbeing of others. Is that a reason, mutatis mutandis, for God to deem it unfitting to arrange things so that we have limited eternal autonomy as characterized by the naIve universalist? Of course not. An earthly life arranged so
that those choices that contribute toward earthly indifference have no
effect on the fact that after death one will be in eternal communion with
God need not be a life devoid of such love and responsibility.
Wrapping up, we can pose Murray's Argument from the Denial of
Autonomy with a dilemma. Either we characterize limited eternal autonomy as he does or as the naIve universalist does. If we do the former, then
his premise 3-i.e., 3m-is false. If we do the latter, then premise 4-i.e.,
4u-is false.
4. Divine Love and Human Dignity

Murray explicitly presents two arguments against naIve universalism. In
the last section of his discussion of sophisticated universalism, however, he
implicitly presents another argument against naIve universalism.
The naive universalist affirms that a God who was perfect in love would
not permit autonomy with respect to being indifferent toward Him forever;
a God who was perfect in love would miraculously transform those who are
indifferent toward Him at life's end. Murray turns the tables. He argues that
it is precisely because God is perfect in love that He would insist on autonomy. It is precisely because God is perfect in love that He would never miraculously transform those who are indifferent toward Him. He writes:
If my adult son decides to choose a career, a mate, etc. which I believe

(or know) will be destructive for him, I may counsel him in the
strongest terms not to do so. But if I were to kidnap him and surgically or chemically alter his brain so that he will not choose those things,
I would be meddling in a way that displayed disrespect for his autonomy as a person, and thus did not display love for him at all. 15To interfere in this way would remove his autonomy and thus the meaningfulness of his freedom, and this would be to undermine both his human
dignity and the real purpose of the earthly life: autonomous soul-making. Thus, it seems that, in fact, love does not clearly require miraculous transformation of the recalcitrant unbeliever. (66)
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The implication is clear. If God were to transform the recalcitrant unbeliever
miraculously after death, He would be "meddling in a way that displayed
disrespect for his autonomy as a person". Such disrespect would not" display
love for him at all". Rather, it would "undermine both his human dignity and
the real purpose of earthly life: autonomous soul-making," hardly the activity
of one who is perfect in love. What should we make of this argument?
We can put it fairly and clearly like this:

The Argument from Divine Love and Human Dignity
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Necessarily, if naIve universalism is true, then God miraculously transforms recalcitrant unbelievers after death.
Necessarily, if God miraculously transforms recalcitrant unbelievers after death, He removes their autonomy.
If God removes their autonomy, He removes the meaningfulness of their freedom.
Necessarily, if God removes the meaningfulness of their freedom, He undermines their human dignity and the real purpose
of their earthly lives (autonomous soul-making).
Necessarily, if God undermines their human dignity and the
real purpose of their earthly lives (autonomous soul-making),
then He does not love them perfectly.
God does love them perfectly.
So, naIve universalism is false. (1-6)

As with Murray's earlier arguments, this one suffers from overstatement.
Nobody-traditionalist and universalist alike-should accept premise 2.
God does not remove (Murray's word) the autonomy of recalcitrant unbelievers by miraculously transforming them after their death. Rather, He
restricts their autonomy. If we wish to use the word "remove", then, lest we
misrepresent naIve universalism, we must specify exactly what He
removes; and, on naIve universalism, God only removes autonomy with
respect to eternal recalcitrance.
If we're going to proceed, we'll need a more accurate representation of
the implications of naIve universalism in premise 2. Consider it done. In
that case, premise 3 must be modified as well, to retain a valid argument.
Thus, we get this modification of the first few premises of the argument:
1.
2*.
3*.
4*.

Necessarily, if naIve universalism is true, then God miraculously transforms recalcitrant unbelievers after death.
Necessarily, if God miraculously transforms recalcitrant unbelievers after death, then He removes their autonomy with
respect to being eternally recalcitrant.
If God removes their autonomy with respect to being eternally
recalcitrant, then He removes the meaningfulness of their freely
choosing to be eternally recalcitrant.
Necessarily, if God removes the meaningfulness of their freely
choosing to be eternally recalcitrant, then He undermines their
human dignity and the real purpose of their earthly lives, i.e.
autonomous soul-making.
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From here the argument proceeds as before.
Unfortunately, this needed modification has a false premise, namely
premise 4*. All manner of autonomous soul-making may well occur even if
God removes one's autonomy with respect to being eternally recalcitrant,
and (hence) the meaningfulness of one's freely choosing to be eternally
recalcitrant. Murray can avoid the objection here by modifying premise 4*
as follows:
4**. Necessarily, if God removes the meaningfulness of their freely
choosing to be eternally recalcitrant, then He undermines their
human dignity and the real purpose of their earthly lives, i.e.
autonomy with respect to being eternally recalcitrant.
What should we make of 4**?
I think it's false. 4** is true only if human dignity rests entirely on one's
autonomy with respect to being eternally recalcitrant. But it doesn't.
Human dignity is not an all-or-nothing affair; it can be exemplified to a
greater or lesser degree. In that case, even if lacking autonomy with respect
to being eternally recalcitrant somewhat undermines human dignity, it
need not undermine it entirely or even extensively. There is so much more
that dignifies human beings.
But what of Murray's analogy with his son? If God were to miraculously transform the recalcitrant unbeliever after death, wouldn't that be like a
father altering his adult son's brain against his will so that he chose a less
destructive path (career, mate, etc.)? And since the latter is objectionable,
isn't the former?
I suspect that there are significant and relevant differences between the
two cases. First, the destructive consequences of choosing a mate or career
badly are not even remotely so grave as those of choosing to reject God on the
traditionalist scheme. Moreover, as the gravity of the consequences of an
adult son's choices increases, so does the plausibility of loving intervention on
the part of a father or friend. Think in this connection of parents who "rescue"
their older child from a cult that has brainwashed them into subservience
(even if the child freely entered the cult), or who bring their strung-out adult
children to rehabilitation and recovery centers. But even in such cases as
these, the gravity of the situation does not even come close to that of rejecting
God on traditionalism. Second, and more importantly by my lights, no father
is God. And even though a son belongs to his father, that son belongs to God
in a much more fundamental way than he belongs to his father. The relationship between a human father and his son may well not ground a right to
intervene and rescue his son from the gravest consequences of his free choices, whereas the relationship between God and one of us may well ground
such a right, perhaps even an obligation. It seems to me that it is not at all
clear that the analogy Murray offers is detrimental to naiVe universalism.

5. Concluding Remarks
Contrary to what Murray avers, naIve universalism is at home with our
earthly free choices having enormous repercussions not only here and now
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but in eternity. If we are to argue against it, therefore, we must do so while
acknowledging its resources to dignify human beings and to invest their
earthly choices with eternal significance.
Lest the import of what I have argued be misunderstood, I want to
make it clear that, for all I have argued, there may be some other reasons of
a philosophical nature for concluding that naIve universalism is false or
otherwise defective. Much more importantly, however, nothing I've said
rules out the view that the plain sense of Holy Scripture and the teaching
of the Church precludes naive universalism. In short, nothing I've said is
even remotely relevant to the view that I hold, namely that God has pretty
much informed us that universalism, in both its naIve and sophisticated
forms, is false. 16
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